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ABSTRACT Physical layer security has been recently recognized as a promising new design paradigm
to provide security in wireless networks. In addition to the existing conventional cryptographic methods,
physical layer security exploits the dynamics of fading channels to enhance secured wireless links. In this
approach, jamming plays a key role by generating noise signals to confuse the potential eavesdroppers,
and significantly improves quality and reliability of secure communications between legitimate terminals.
This article presents theoretical limits and practical designs of jamming approaches for physical layer
security. In particular, the theoretical limits explore the achievable secrecy rates of user cooperation-based
jamming whilst the centralized and game theoretic-based precoding techniques are reviewed for practical
implementations. In addition, the emerging wireless energy harvesting techniques are exploited to harvest
the required energy to transmit jamming signals. Future directions of these approaches and the associated
research challenges are also briefly outlined.
INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, cooperative jamming, full-duplex systems, game theory, wireless
energy harvesting.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless communications, the exponential growth of
mobile traffic and newly emerging wireless applications
introduce different security risks due to their broadcasting
nature. The secured communication links in traditional wire-
less networks are established through conventional crypto-
graphic methods. However, these methods impose different
challenges in terms of key exchange and distribution, espe-
cially in the current trend of dynamic network configurations.
Recently, physical layer security has been recognised as one
of the potential solutions to enhance security in wireless net-
works by exploiting characteristics of wireless channels [1].
In addition, this novel paradigm complements the conven-
tional cryptographic methods, and well suits for dynamic
networks and distributed processing techniques.
Physical layer security jamming is a well known
approach to enhance the quality of secure wireless
transmissions [2]–[4]. In this technique, additional jamming
signals are transmitted to confuse the potential eavesdroppers
or to degrade the decoding capability of the unintended
receivers. These jamming signals can be introduced by
embedding themwith the intended signals, which are referred
as artificial noise (AN) approach in the literature. On the other
hand, a receiver can be also used to transmit jamming signals
with the help of full duplex (FD) radios, which have the
capability to simultaneously transmit and receive the signals.
Hence, FD receiver can be exploited to receive the required
signals while sending jamming signals at the same time to
confuse the eavesdroppers [3]. However, this transmit and
receive jamming scheme might not be possible under all
circumstances due to limited available number of antennas
and the strong self-interference (SI). In this scenario, the
external nodes can be employed to send jamming signals,
where they could be relay nodes or private jammers [5], [6].
VOLUME 5, 2017
2169-3536 
 2016 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
3603
K. Cumanan et al.: Physical Layer Security Jamming: Theoretical Limits and Practical Designs in Wireless Networks
In case of private jammers, they could introduce charges for
their dedicated jamming services. The problems associated
with these private jammers can be formulated into different
game theoretic problems by considering the legitimate nodes
and the private jammers as the players of the game.
This article focuses on physical layer security jamming
techniques based on user cooperations and external nodes.
Firstly, theoretical limits of jamming through user cooper-
ation is presented, and then multi-antenna based jamming
techniques are reviewed by exploiting their spatial diversity
and degrees of freedom (DoF). For example, the advan-
tages of jamming with multi-antenna transmitter can be eas-
ily demonstrated by appropriately designing beamformers
such that it would cause a significant interference to the
eavesdroppers while no or less interference leakage to the
intended receivers. However, the study of theoretical limits of
jamming and the practical designs are necessary to achieve
the optimal performance in secrecy networks. This article
presents these theoretical limits and design approaches as
follows. First, theoretical limits of user cooperation based
jamming are explored. Then, centralized and game theoretic
based multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) transmit and
receive precoding techniques are discussed to provide effi-
cient jamming services. In addition, wireless energy harvest-
ing (WEH) based jamming techniques are presented through
the recent advancement in simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) concept. Finally, future research
challenges of jamming schemes are briefly discussed.
II. INFORMATION-THEORETIC LIMITS OF JAMMING
In this section, we present the theoretical limits of
cooperative-users based jamming for physical layer security.
The concept of cooperative jamming (CJ) was introduced
in [2] for a Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel
(GMAC-WT) from an information-theoretic aspect. In the
GMAC-WT channel, multiple legitimate users wish to send
secret messages to a common receiver in the presence of
a passive eavesdropper. In order to maximize all the sum
secrecy rate, a user should send pure Gaussian noise as long
as the eavesdropping channel from it to the eavesdropper is
stronger than the legitimate channel from it to the intended
receiver. The CJ scheme can be illustrated via a simple
two-user GMAC-WT channel as shown in Fig. 1, where a
transmitter (Alice) wishes to send a secret message W1 to
the intended receiver (Bob) under the help of an interferer
(Carlo), without leaking any information to the eavesdropper
(Eve). The channel gains from Alice to Bob and Eve are
normalized to be 1 and
√
a; the channel gains from Carlo
to Bob and Eve are normalized to be
√
b and 1. Note that
the channel gains from Alice to Bob and from Carlo to
Eve are different with each other although both of them are
normalized to 1, which is reflected by the fact that both
the channels have different effects on the received signal-
noise-ratios (SNRs) at Bob and Eve. This channel model
is also called the wiretap channel with a helping interferer
(WT-HI) in [7]. When b < 1, Carlo can help Alice and Bob
FIGURE 1. (a) The wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI). (b)
The WT-HI channel with artificial state.
to enhance the security level by sending Gaussian noise that
is independent of the message-carrying signal. This can be
interpreted by the fact that Carlo’s jamming signal harms
Eve more than Bob when b < 1, which may improve the
achievable secrecy rate.
CJ is useful only when b < 1 in the WT-HI channel
in Fig. 1 (a). But, when b > 1, i.e., Carlo has a stronger
channel to Bob than to Eve, CJ in [2] might not be useful.
In this case, Carlo can still help Alice and Bob using the
noise forwarding (NF) scheme in [8]. In NF, Carlo can ran-
domly choose a codeword from a known codebook with an
appropriate coding rate such that the confusion signal can
be decoded by Bob before the decoding of W1, and hence,
without affecting the message-carrying signal, still jams the
eavesdropping channel. An interpretation of NF is that the
independent confusion codewords can bring additional ran-
domness to the channel to enhance the security level. The
main difference betweenNF andCJ is that, the former designs
the confusion signals with structure that does not jam Bob,
whereas the latter uses pure noise that jams Bob and Eve
simultaneously.
Both CJ and NF can be generalized into a unified frame-
work based on the adaptive adjustment of the coding rate at
Carlo, which is called interference assisted (IA) scheme in [7]
for the WT-HI channel. The main difference between the IA
and NF schemes is that, in the former, Carlo treats its coding
rate as a variable, and adaptively adjusts this coding rate
to maximize the achievable secrecy rate; while in the latter,
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FIGURE 2. Achievable secrecy rates of the IA and AS-based schemes for
the WT-HI channel shown in Fig. 1 (a), where the maximum transmit
power at Alice and Carlo are 20 and 50, respectively. Since the IA scheme
is a generalization of the CJ and NF scheme, its achievable secrecy rate is
the same as that of the CJ scheme when b < 1 and the same as that of
the NF scheme when b > 1.
Carlo always chooses a coding rate such that the interference
transmitted by him does not affect Bob. Both CJ and NF can
be viewed as the special cases of the IA scheme. When the
coding rate at Carlo is lower than a certain rate such that
Bob can decode the interference before decoding the secret
message, the IA scheme reduces to NF; when the coding rate
at Carlo is sufficiently large such that both Bob and Eve have
no choice but to treat the interference as pure noise, the IA
scheme reduces to CJ.
CJ and NF can also be generalized by the channel prefixing
scheme in secure communications. As shown in the Gaussian
WT-HI channel in Fig. 1 (a), the confusion signal transmitted
by Carlo can consist of two parts, i.e., X2 = U2 + Z2, where
one part (U2) is the codeword with the structure following
the NF scheme, and the other part (Z2) is pure Gaussian noise
following the CJ scheme. In this channel prefixing scheme,
the channel input X2 at Carlo becomes a noisy version of
the interference codeword U2 in terms of the Markov chain
U2−X2−Y1,Y2. In addition to Carlo’s channel prefixing, the
work in [9] also adopted a channel prefixing scheme at Alice
based on artificial state (AS), and the achievable secrecy rate
can be further enhanced. Specifically, Alice spends part of its
transmit power to generate an AS S1, i.e., it sets the channel
input as X1 = X˜1 + S1 as shown in Fig. 1 (b). Now, the
WT-HI channel in Fig. 1 (a) becomes a WT-HI channel with
state information as shown in Fig. 1 (b), where the random
state S1 is known by Alice a priori and X˜1 can be viewed as
the virtual channel input. Then following the concept of dirty
paper coding (DPC), we introduce an auxiliary variableU1 =
X˜1 + βS1 as the message-carrying codeword. According to
DPC, S1 will not affect the decoding of the message-carrying
codeword U1 at Bob by appropriately setting the value of β.
Fig. 2 shows achievable secrecy rates of the IA and
AS-based schemes for theWT-HI channel shown in Fig. 1 (a),
where the maximum normalized transmit power at Alice and
Carlo are 20 and 50. For both schemes, Gaussian codebooks
are adopted, where the message-bared signal X1 ∼ N (0,P1),
and the Gaussian interference X2 ∼ N (0,P2), 0 ≤ P1 ≤ 20,
0 ≤ P2 ≤ 50. Furthermore, the AS-based scheme sets
X˜1 ∼ (0, (1 − λ)P1), S1 ∼ (0, λP1). The optimal values
of these parameters (P1,P2, λ) are established via exhaustive
searches. As shown in Fig. 2, when a > 1, the AS at Alice is
important to get a larger secrecy rate if compared with the
NF (or IA) scheme. Particularly, when b = 1, Carlo can
still assist Alice to achieve a positive secrecy rate, whereas
the CJ, NF and IA schemes fail. This can be interpreted by
the fact that the AS at Alice can associate with the helping
interference at Carlo to further confuse Eve without affecting
Bob. Fig. 2 also shows that the gap between the AS-based and
the NF schemes can be enlarged by increasing a from 1 to 7.
Moreover, the AS-based scheme reduces to the CJ (or IA)
scheme when b < 1/a, thanks to the channel prefixing at
Carlo.
The works in [2] and [7]–[9] used information-theoretical
Gaussian codebooks with infinite alphabets, which is hard
to implement in practice. Alternatively, the work in [10]
has proposed an achievable scheme based on layered nested
lattice codes with an finite alphabets. Interestingly, unlike tra-
ditional communications without secrecy constraints, the use
of more practical lattice codes can outperform the Gaussian
codebook for the channel model in Fig. 1 (a) for certain cases.
Specifically, the scheme in [10] can achieve non-zero secure
degree of freedom (s.d.o.f.) for all values of channel gain
pair (
√
a,
√
b) except when ab = 1, whereas the works [2]
and [7]–[9] fail to achieve non-zero s.d.o.f.. This is because,
based on nested lattice codes, the signals transmitted by both
the source and the cooperative jammer can be aligned at the
eavesdropper but remain separable at the intended receiver;
whereas the Gaussian noise transmitted by the cooperative
jammer simultaneously interferes with the eavesdropper, and
hurts the intended receive.
III. MIMO JAMMING: CENTRALIZED APPROACH
In this section, we review key results of using MIMO to
transmit judiciously jamming signals with an aim to achieve
higher secrecy rate. Specifically, centralized transmit and
receive jamming techniques are discussed in the following
subsections.
A. TRANSMIT JAMMING
Consider a basic three-node system, which consists of a
transmitter, an intended receiver and an eavesdropper. The
transmitter has multiple antennas, while the receiver and the
eavesdropper may havemultiple antennas or a single antenna.
The secrecy capacity is well known [1] when the channel
state information (CSI) is available to all nodes. While it is
reasonable to assume to have the receiver’s CSI, it is usually
unrealistic to obtain the eavesdropper’s CSI. In the casewhere
only the receiver’s CSI is known but the eavesdropper’s CSI
is absent, the transmit jamming or AN is an effective means
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FIGURE 3. MIMO Jamming. (a) Transmit jamming when the transmitter has multiple antennas; (b) Receive jamming when the
receiver has multiple antennas and works in the FD mode.
to improve the secrecy rate. As shown in Fig. 3 (a), the
total transmit signal is split into two parts. The first one is
the information-bearing message towards the direction of the
receiver, which can be designed based on the receiver’s CSI.
The second part is the transmit jamming, which is isotropic
Gaussian noise in the orthogonal space of the receiver’s chan-
nel. By doing so, the transmit jamming does not affect the
intended receiver but only degrades the quality of the signal
received by the eavesdropper. A remarkable result about this
simple transmit jamming scheme shown in [1] is that, it can
achieve secrecy rate close to the capacity in the high SNR
regime when the receiver has a single antenna.
The use of transmit jamming consumes some transmit
power so it reduces the SNR at the receiver. Therefore it
is important to allocate power to the information-bearing
signals and the jamming signals properly. While it is in
general difficult to achieve the optimal power allocation, a
general rule of thumb is to allocate more power to jamming
when the receiver’s CSI is more accurate or the number of
the eavesdropper’s antennas increases to achieve effective
jamming.
B. RECEIVE JAMMING
Transmit jamming is useful but requires the support of mul-
tiple antennas. When the transmitter has a single antenna, is
it still possible to take advantage of jamming? Fortunately,
there is a positive answer to this question. One possible
solution is to use jamming at the receiver side to confuse
the eavesdropper. There are different implementations. For
instance, the transmitter repeats the transmission for a certain
times, and the receiver randomly jams the transmissions [11].
Because the eavesdropper does not know which transmission
is left unjammed, it cannot decode the message correctly.
One drawback of this scheme is that, it requires retransmis-
sion, which is less bandwidth efficient and may be critical
for delay-sensitive applications. Next we introduce a receive
jamming scheme without using retransmissions.
Traditionally a wireless node works in the half-
duplex (HD) mode. The FD operation, which allows a
wireless node to transmit and receive simultaneously in the
same frequency band has emerged as an attractive solution
to improve the spectral efficiency. The FD operation has
also shown great potential to improve physical layer security.
As depicted in Fig. 3(b), the main idea is that the intended
receiver sends jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper’s
channel and protect its own reception [3]. Obviously the
receive jamming will affect both the intended receiver itself
and the eavesdropper because of the resulting SI, but if the SI
can be well controlled/optimized, it will favor the intended
receiver. When the receiver has multiple transmit or receive
antennas, it can employ joint transmit and receive beam-
forming for simultaneous signal detection, SI suppression
and jamming emission. An interesting result in [3] is that
when the global CSI is available, the secrecy rate increases
unbounded as the SNR goes up, which is in contrast to the
traditional HD case without receive jamming. Even when
only statistical information about the eavesdropper’s channel
is known, substantial secrecy rate improvement is observed.
Obviously, transmit and receive jamming can be combined to
further improve the secrecy rate in a MIMO wiretap channel.
In addition, both of these jamming techniques can be directly
applied to the relay jamming schemes, where a set of trusted
half-duplex or full-duplex relays can help the communication
between legitimate terminals while introducing jamming sig-
nals to the eavesdroppers. The half-duplex relays could intro-
duce artificial noise to the eavesdroppers while transmitting
the signal to the legitimate users. On the other hand, the full-
duplex relays could transmit jamming signal, while receiving
the signals from the source. Specifically, the artificial noise
approach with half-duplex relays can be considered as the
transmit jamming, whereas the receive jamming represents
the full-duplex relay based jamming scheme.
IV. MIMO JAMMING: GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
In this section, we review game theoretic based jamming
approaches for physical layer security. The centralized
transmitter-receiver based jamming schemes discussed in the
previous section might not be able to achieve the required
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FIGURE 4. (a) A MIMO secrecy network with multiple eavesdroppers and
private jammers. (b) The concept of equilibrium for the
transmitter-private jammers game.
performance under all circumstances due to channel condi-
tions and the strong SI. In this scenario, external jammers can
be employed to improve the quality of the secure communica-
tions by introducing jamming signals to the eavesdroppers as
shown in Fig. 4 (a) [5], [6]. However, these external (private)
jammers charge for their dedicated jamming services from
the transmitter based on the amount of interference caused
at the eavesdroppers. In order to compensate these prices,
the transmitter introduces charges for its enhanced secure
transmission from the legitimate users. In this scenario, both
the transmitter and the private jammers compete to maximize
their revenues by providing higher secrecy rates at the legit-
imate users and selling the interference to the transmitter,
respectively.
In order to analyze the interactions between the trans-
mitter and the private jammers, game theory provides the
mathematical structure and concepts to formulate this sce-
nario into different games, where both the transmitter and
the private jammers will be the players of the game [12].
In addition, analytical results obtained through these games
based on the strategic decisions of the players will help to
conclude whether there is an equilibrium in their revenues
for the proposed game as shown in Fig. 4(b), at which both
players achieve their maximum revenues. On the other hand,
achieving these equilibria among the players might introduce
more complexity in the network, even though they are bene-
ficial for all players. To circumvent these complexity issues,
game theory also facilitates to develop distributed and low
complexity based implementation to attain these equilibria.
Based on whether it is a collaboration or competition among
the players, these games can be classified into cooperative
and non-cooperative games, respectively [12].
A secrecy network model is considered with one trans-
mitter and one legitimate user, where private jammers help
to improve the secure transmission by causing interference
to the eavesdroppers as shown in Fig. 4(a). The transmitter,
the legitimate user and the private jammers are all equipped
with multiple antennas. As mentioned earlier, the interaction
of buying interference from private jammers and announcing
interference prices to the transmitter can be formulated into a
Stackelberg game, where the private jammers and the trans-
mitter are the leaders (Player 1) and the follower (Player 2) of
the game, respectively [12]. In order to study this game, the
best responses of both the players should be derived, where
the best interference requirements for a given interference
price and the best interference price for a given interference
requirements will be obtained at both the players. Based
on these best responses, the Stackelberg equilibrium can be
achieved by deriving the optimal interference requirement
and the interference prices. At this equilibrium as shown in
Fig. 4(b), both of the players will achieve their maximum
revenues and the deviation of any player from this equilibrium
will cause a loss in their revenues. This equilibrium can be
implemented by exchanging the associated channel responses
between the transmitter and the private jammers. However,
this might introduce more complexity in the network. There-
fore, a distributed implementation of this equilibrium would
bemore appropriate to reduce the complexity, where the inter-
ference prices offered by the jammers and the interference
requirements at the transmitter can be iteratively updated [5].
The secrecy network might consist of multiple legitimate
multi-antenna transmitter-receiver pairs as well as a friendly
jammer in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In this
scenario, each pair tries to maximize its secrecy rate with
the help of the friendly jammer by introducing interference to
the eavesdroppers. However, the jamming signals will cause
interference not only to the eavesdroppers but also to the des-
tinations, which will degrade the secrecy rate performance.
Therefore, the jammer should distribute its power among the
users such that the secrecy rate performance is improved.
These interactions between the pairs and the jammer can be
formulated into an auction game, where the transmitters and
the jammer will be the bidders and auctioneer [12], respec-
tively. The transmitters will submit their bids to the jammer
depending on the payment of the corresponding jammer-
power and the secrecy rate improvement whereas the jammer
will determine the optimal power allocations between the
users based on these bids. For this game, a distributed solu-
tion can be developed by exploiting the distributed auction
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theoretic approach, where the bids from the transmitters and
power allocations between the users will be updated
iteratively.
V. ENHANCING PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY IN
WIRELESS ENERGY HARVESTING NETWORKS
Since there has been an upsurge of research interest
as well as emerging applications for radio-frequency (RF)
signal-enabled wireless energy transfer, which avails the
broadcasting and far-field radiative properties of electromag-
netic (EM) wave to power wireless devices in particular,
while transferring information, new challenges as well as
opportunities for physical layer security begin arising in these
WEH-enabled networks. In this section, we discuss the-state-
of-art technologies enhancing physical layer security for one
important class of WEH application, i.e., wireless powered
communication network (WPCN).
FIGURE 5. A WPCN model employing harvest-and-jam (HJ) protocol.
Physical layer security issues in the rapidly developed
cooperative networks such as device-to-device systems, relay
networks etc., have already drawn significant attention and
inter alia, CJ has been widely studied as a promising tech-
nology [2], [4]. However, the benefits of CJ would be quite
compromised if those energy-limited potential helpers are
unwilling to cooperate. In the following, we introduce how
this bottleneck could be broken with self-sustainable termi-
nals in aWPCN. Benefiting from dense radio-frequency (RF)
signals of increasing amount of data transmission in the
cooperative networks, a newly designed two-phase protocol,
i.e., harvest-and-jam (HJ) was proposed in [13] to achieve
secrecy transmission by CJ and yet not to add extra power
cost. Specifically, as illustrated in Fig. 5, in the first transmis-
sion phase, a single-antenna transmitter sends confidential
information to a multi-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF)
relay with conventional power supply and simultaneously
transfers power to a group of idle multi-antenna users serving
as helpers; in the second transmission phase, the AF relay
amplifies, and forwards the message to the legitimate receiver
under the protection of jamming, which is generated from
each of the helpers by its harvested power in the previ-
ous transmission phase. The secrecy rate is maximized by
optimizing the transmit beamforming matrix for the AF relay
and the jamming covariance matrices for each of the helpers
subject to transmit power constraints, under circumstances of
perfect and imperfect CSI available at the coordinating node,
respectively.
The results in [13] showed that the HJ scheme plays a
prominent role in improving secret communications in practi-
cal scenarios of imperfect CSI. Especially, when CSIs related
to the eavesdropper are hard to obtain and more imper-
fect than those related to the legitimate users, the optimal
power allocation scheme inclines to jam the eavesdropper
using all available power, and hence considerably degrades
its information reception while minimizing the interference
caused to the legitimate receiver. Typically, in a WPCN setup
where helpers are fixed and evenly distributed around a
disk centered on the transmitter with radius 2m, assuming
a simple channel fading model comprising Rayleigh fading
and pathloss given by ( dd0 )
−α , given the reference distance
d0 = 1m and the attenuation factor α = 3, if the transmit
power is set to be 0dBm and the energy conversion efficiency
is 50%, the average per-antenna harvested power at each
helper is around 62.5µW.
Besides increasing the secrecy rate (short-term metric) via
adaptive power allocation over antennas for AF beamforming
and jamming signal design, [14] considered a similar idea of
increasing the confidential information transmission through-
put (long-term metric) via a wireless-powered friendly jam-
mer by proposing a delicately designed protocol with not
necessarily equal time duration for the ‘‘harvest’’ and ‘‘jam’’
phases. Specifically, defining a ‘‘power transfer (PT)’’ block
for the jammer to harvest energy from the source and an
‘‘information transmission (IT)’’ block for confidential infor-
mation to be transmitted under the protection of a jamming
signal, a threshold amount of energy, i.e., PJT , which sup-
ports jamming using power PJ for a transmission block of
T time unit, is examined at the jammer’s battery storage at
the beginning of each transmission block. Only when this
threshold is achieved, and meanwhile the source-destination
(main channel) does not suffer from communications outage,
the IT block with jamming starts. Otherwise, the transmission
enters into either dedicated PT block (when the threshold
condition is not satisfied) or opportunistic PT block (when
communication outage over the main channel occurs). Based
on this protocol design, four types of PT-IT cycles consisting
of varied combination of these blocks are characterized, and
as a result, the long-term behavior of this stochastic process
has been analyzed with a closed-form achievable throughput.
Finally, the design parameters, PJ and the fixed transmission
rates are optimized to further maximize the secrecy through-
put under the constraint of the secrecy outage probability.
VI. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
In this section, we provide future research challenges asso-
ciated with the physical layer security jamming schemes
discussed in the previous sections.
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A. THEORETICAL LIMITS
Though existing works have proposed a variety of jamming
schemes to enhance security level, the secrecy capacity has
not been found even for the simple WT-HI channel in Fig.
1. Future work of interest is to design more intelligent coding
schemes to achieve the secrecy capacity. For example, though
the AS-based scheme in [9] showed that the channel prefixing
technique is crucial to improve the achievable secrecy rate,
the effects of channel prefixing has not been fully revealed.
Moreover, this paper only considers the jamming schemes
based on Gaussian random coding, which cannot achieve a
positive secure DoF at high SNR, while recent works have
shown that the non-Gaussian codes (e.g., structured codes)
can achieve a positive secure DoF at high SNR. Hence the
design of non-Gaussian codes is also an interesting future
research area.
B. SMART MIMO JAMMING
The majority of literature assumes ideal Gaussian signalling
and therefore the optimal jamming also uses Gaussian sig-
nalling. However, Gaussian signalling is not practical and
wireless systems often employ constant envelop signalling
schemes like phase-shift-keying (PSK). In this case, it is
shown that Gaussian jamming is no longer effective, and
can be removed by the multi-antenna eavesdropper using
blind source separation techniques such as constant modulus
algorithms [15]. Therefore, there is a need to design the smart
jamming signals adaptive to the specific constellation used.
Massive MIMO is a great enabler to achieve spectrum-
efficient and energy-efficient wireless communications.
However, its security implication is not well understood. Our
previous work shows that massive MIMO systems, if care-
fully designed, are actually quite robust against both passive
and active attacks [16]. Further investigation is needed to
understand its potential to effectively jam the eavesdroppers.
C. ROBUST JAMMING GAMES
Effective jamming requires perfect CSI, which is difficult
to obtain in practice. Imperfect CSI may not only degrade
the performance of the legitimate communications but also
results in information leakage to the eavesdroppers. In order
to deal with this issue, it is necessary to consider robust
transmit jamming to achieve guaranteed outage performance
of the secrecy rate. Most of the game theoretic approaches
proposed for physical layer security have been assumed
that the players have the perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers.
In order to overcome the imperfect CSI issues associated
with eavesdroppers in the existing games, robust techniques
should be considered for secure communications. Therefore,
the development of robust jamming games by incorporating
channel uncertainties or the cases of no eavesdroppers’ CSI
along with the corresponding analysis of equilibria would
be very challenging. These robust jamming games could
be formulated into Bayesian games, which are well known
for the scenarios with incomplete information. The jamming
games with imperfect eavesdroppers CSI would be one of the
possible interesting future directions in game theoretic based
jamming for physical layer security.
D. WIRELESS ENERGY HARVESTING
More sophisticated transmission protocols incorporating
adaptive power/rate designs are expected to be studied for
further improving the long-term secrecy throughput in [14].
Besides, to further motivate the potential WEH-enabled
helpers to assist secure communications, more practical
energy and communications mechanism needs to be properly
designed. For example, neighbour-users of the transmitter
could be self-interested and prefer to storing the harvested
energy for their own use rather than help jam. In this situation,
the transmitter needs to offer some spare communications
resource as incentives, such as spectrum, to increase the
cooperation utility and reduce the overall system cost.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, the jamming techniques for physical layer
security have been discussed with different approaches.
In particular, the theoretical limits of user cooperation based
jamming and the practical designs of MIMO jamming as
well as the game theoretic based jamming techniques have
been reviewed. In addition, the WEH based jamming has
also been presented for improving energy efficiency in secure
communications by exploiting the wireless harvested energy
to generate jamming signals to the eavesdroppers. Finally,
future research challenges of these jamming schemes for
physical layer security have been briefly outlined.
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